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Abstract: While it is widely accepted that negotiated settlements are prone to break down, our 
understanding of the processes through which signatories defect lacks precision. A growing 
qualitative literature recognizes the potential for rebel group fluidity, yet the conflict field’s 
converging reliance on dyadic data obscures pathways of defection that result in splintering or merger 
in quantitative studies. An in-depth case study of a failed peace process in Uganda—which is 
misclassified in the extant data—helps to illustrate the ways in which excluded groups can lower the 
opportunity cost of defection for splintering factions, resulting in a strategic alliance. The paper tests 
the generalizability of this argument against the full sample of rebel parties to settlements in Sub-
Saharan Africa (1975-2015) using a large-N qualitative analysis of causal process observations 
(CPOs). The aggregated results provide strong evidence that the defection-by-alliance pathway is 
much more prevalent than previously recognized, accounting for more than one-third of all defections 
in the sample. Where settlements create shared incentives for stakeholders inside and outside the 
peace process to spoil, rebel elites appear more willing to bear the costs of an alliance with a rival, 




Soon after signing the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, the National Democratic Alliance 
fractured over its terms. Although a sizeable proportion of the rebellion remained committed to the 
settlement and demobilized, opposing factions joined forces with militias outside the peace process, 
forming a new umbrella movement called the National Redemption Front.1 Recent examples from 
Libya, Afghanistan, and South Sudan similarly demonstrate the challenges of bargaining for peace 
where the armed opposition is prone to fragmentation and fluidity. Although the topic of negotiating 
stable solutions to conflict has spawned a vast literature in recent decades, our understanding of the 
processes through which settlements break down remains imprecise.  
In recent years, scholars working on conflict resolution have highlighted many of the 
problematic assumptions underlying classic, rationalist models of bargaining, which treat negotiating 
parties as binary and cohesive actors. Work on rebel splintering aims to shift the theoretical focus 
away from the contest occurring between governments and rebels by recognizing an additional layer 
of competition within armed groups over the spoils of peace (Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour 2012; 
Pearlman and Cunningham 2012; Cunningham 2013; Best and Bapat 2018; Plank 2017). Qualitative 
work has been especially illustrative in shedding light on the dynamics of factionalism and 
fragmentation in cases as varied as Liberia (Lidow 2016; Bekoe 2005), Palestine (Pearlman 2009), 
and Central African Republic (Debos 2008). 
Significant gaps remain, however. For one thing, comparability issues and the resulting 
scarcity of cross-national data on splintering means that the current state of knowledge is largely 
limited to formal theories of bargaining and a few, potentially unique cases. Moreover, the increasing 
attention to internal factionalism has obscured the interactions between competing rebellions during a 
peace process, with the implicit assumption that these “layers” of contestation are theoretically and 
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analytically discrete. Although a wealth of recent scholarship explores the potential for rival groups to 
act as violent spoilers or potential allies during a peace process (Reiter 2016; Nygård and Weintraub 
2015; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Akcinaroglu 2012; Nilsson 2008; Atlas and Licklider 1999), there is 
ample opportunity for improved coordination between the literatures on splintering and spoiling in 
seeking to build a more valid theory of rebel defection. 
This paper attempts to fill these gaps by identifying a generalizable logic of defection which 
accounts for rebel group fluidity. By analysing the ways in which internal and external rivalries 
interact to shape the incentive structures facing faction elites, the theoretical framework explicitly 
recognizes the link between two domains of contestation in the post-settlement period. Once a 
settlement is signed and the terms are no longer considered malleable, the selective allocation of 
benefits often generates incentives for rebel elites both inside and outside the peace process to spoil. 
In such contexts, I argue that disgruntled leaders should be more willing to bear the cost of an alliance 
with an erstwhile rival in order to maximize the viability of their return to rebellion.  
My goal in this paper is not to offer a holistic theory of settlement breakdown. A 
comprehensive analysis would need to account or control for a range of variables, such as the 
presence of peacekeepers (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008; De Waal 2009), rival factions’ recruitment 
capacity (Mosinger 2018; Gates 2002; Weinstein 2007), and shifts in the prevailing balance of power 
(Best and Bapat 2018; Werner 1999; Bekoe 2005; Mehler 2009). Heterogeneity in defection pathways 
helps to explain why extant cross-national work fails to reach consistent conclusions, with findings 
sensitive to model specification. If post-settlement splintering is facilited by a merger of forces—as 
this paper suggests—such cases of defection are disproportionately likely to be overlooked or 
misclassified in the cross-national conflict data, which treats armed groups as discrete. As an example, 
two of the most prominent rebellions to emerge in eastern Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) since 
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the end of the Second Congolese War—the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) 
and the M-23—were created when defecting factions of signatories to the comprehensive 2003 
settlement incorporated otherwise inconsequential militias in the region and repackaged the movement 
under a new name. And yet, each of these groups receive discrete actor identification numbers in the 
UCDP Armed Conflict dataset (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013), and settlement signatory parties 
drop out of the data after 2003. To what extent are such cases of recurrence “hidden” in the data as 
resolved conflicts? And what are the implications for the conclusions we reach about the causes of 
defection? There is clearly a need for an updated analytical approach to rebel decision-making which 
allows for variation in conflict outcomes beyond the dichotomous classification of termination or 
recurrence favoured in quantitative work. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section draws on existing conflict literature to 
identify competing explanations for rebel defection from settlements. In section III, I propose an 
original theory of defection by strategic alliance, whereby the presence of an excluded rebellion 
lowers the opportunity cost for disgruntled factions of the signatory party to defect. Drawing on 
extensive field research conducted in Uganda, section IV provides an in-depth case study of a failed 
1988-1990 peace process that is illustrative of the proposed mechanism of defection, as well as 
revealing the validity problems that may arise when measuring armed groups discretely. In order to 
test my theory, the empirical analysis relies on a two-stage qualitative research design, described in 
section V. I first defined and measured a set of causal process observations (CPOs) consistent with the 
theoretical logic and the Ugandan case, and then analysed the frequency of various post-settlement 
trajectories across the full sample of rebel parties to settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa (1975-2015). 
The aggregated results, which are discussed in section VI, provide strong evidence that the defection-
by-alliance pathway is much more prevalent than previously recognized, accounting for more than 
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one-in-three cases of defection in the sample. Section VII concludes with a discussion of the 
implications for policy and scholarship, as well as avenues for future research. 
 
Relevant literature on rebel defection  
The conflict literature has produced clear expectations about factors that make signatories 
more or less likely to defect from settlements. The common theoretical framework rests on a 
rationalist approach adopted from IR, whereby violent conflict is understood to reflect the inability of 
rivals to credibly commit to peace (Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000; Powell 2002, 2006; de Figueiredo and 
Weingast 1999; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999).2 Similar to the state of anarchy characterizing the 
international system, a vacuum of state authority generates a “security dilemma” (Jervis 1978; Posen 
1993), such that weak states are unable to monopolize violence within their borders. Thus, even if 
belligerent parties can agree to the terms of peace, their true intentions are obscured by information 
gaps, which heighten mutual suspicions and incentivize signatories to pre-emptively abandon the 
settlement before being caught out by a rival. Meanwhile, group preferences are inconsistent across 
time, with events occuring during the implementation process that threaten to shift the balance of 
power and cause one side to seek to renegotiate, often with violence (Werner 1999). From this 
perspective, unless a third party is present to enforce the terms and bind parties to their commitments, 
the likelihood of defection is high (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008). 
 Although commitment theory has been central to coordination in the field, the underlying 
model makes a number of nontrivial assumptions that limit its real-world utility. Modelling 
negotiations as a one-shot game between two cohesive actors is helpful to building parsimonious 
theories, and it may be valid in an IR context, where rival actors are states.3 However, with research 
indicating that weak states provide fertile ground for insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003), states that 
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are unable to prevent the onset of violence may be susceptible to a proliferation of armed groups, 
especially those sufficiently weak to consent to negotiations. Peace processes are therefore likely to 
involve or exclude numerous, competing rebellions, and this has implications for bargaining 
strategies.  
Recognizing this empirical reality, the two decades since Stephen Stedman’s (1997) influential 
paper has witnessed a growing body of work on the topic of “spoiler problems” in multilateral 
conflicts (Reiter 2016; Findley 2013; Ayres 2006; Zahar 2008; Hampson 1996). This effort has been 
facilitated by the release of cross-national data measuring conflicts at the level of government-rebel 
dyad, rather than country, making it possible to address variation in the constellation of armed groups 
active across space and time and to pursue research questions about, for example, the benefits and 
challenges of all-inclusive settlements. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al. 
2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2013), in particular, has become a cornerstone for quantitative work 
in the field. Building on the rationalist approach outlined above, this literature rests on a general 
consensus that spoiler behavior enhances the commitment problems underlying a peace process. Not 
only should it be more difficult to reach agreement on the terms where more “veto players” exist 
(Cunningham 2006), but negotiations should also be prone to violent spoiling from excluded groups 
hoping to gain a seat at the table, or else undermine the bargain altogether (Kydd and Walter 2006; 
Tull and Mehler 2005). Thus, much of the prescriptive focus again rests on international actors’ ability 
to facilitate a mutually acceptable bargain and subsequently reign in incentives for spoiling during the 
transition period. 
A second problem with the assumptions of the conventional rationalist approach is in failing to 
account for the internal factionalism that often characterizes a rebellion. Modelling and measuring 
post-settlement outcomes dichotomously—rebels either demobilize and conflict terminates, or else 
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they defect and return to war—obscures variation in elite preferences over a settlement, not only 
across time or across rebel groups, but also across factions within a signatory party. In recent years, a 
new literature has emerged to challenge this notion of non-state groups as cohesive actors and 
examine the potential for rebel fragmentation or splintering (Pearlman and Cunningham 2012; Bakke, 
Cunningham and Seymour 2012; Schlichte 2009). Scholars in this field recognize that bargaining 
parties are embedded in what has been called a “dual contest” (Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 
2012) or “nested game” (Pearlman 2009, citing Tsebelis 1991)—the external pursuit of the group’s 
common goals vis-à-vis rivals, as well as an internal struggle over private advantage. Empirically, this 
points to an alternative defection pathway, in which one faction of a signatory party may remain 
committed to the terms of a settlement and disarm—a partial demobilization—while another returns to 
violent rebellion (see Figure 1). The implications of overlooking splintering as a form of defection 
should not be understated, as research shows that rebel fragmentation increases both the duration of 
conflict and the likelihood of recurrence (Cunningham 2013; Findley and Rudloff 2012; Rudloff and 
Findley 2016; Ishiyama and Batta 2011). 
 
 




In seeking to identify the ways in which internal contests over group goals, preferences, and 
leadership may ultimately translate into splintering, scholars emphasize the capacity of latent 
defectors to access the resources of war—especially financing, weapons, and recruits. More 
specifically, existing research points to the presence of an external patron (Greenhill and Major 2007; 
Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed 2017; Tamm 2016) or access to resource rents (Stedman 1997; 
Weinstein 2007) as key to the viability of a nascent, splintering rebellion. However, the extant 
literature has failed to consider whether the presence of other active rebellions may similarly affect the 
potential for splintering. According to Pearlman and Cunningham (2012, 7), “we should expect 
external impulses to interact with internal fragmentation to open and restrict constraints on actors’ 
choice[s].” Yet by assuming that armed groups behave strictly as rivals during a peace process, it is 
unclear whether groups with a shared incentive to spoil a settlement may directly provide 
opportunities for splintering factions to defect, rather than merely using violence to enhance 
uncertainty or demonstrate bargaining power. This is an important difference in the type of spoiling 
behaviour, since post-settlement trajectories that result in mergers or umbrella coalitions may appear 
in the data as new groups and may therefore be misclassified as cases of conflict termination. With 
this in mind, the next section draws on insights generated from each of these lines of inquiry to 
develop a theory of defection by strategic alliance. 
 
Theory of defection by alliance 
 A broad literature exists on the determinants of factionalism during bargaining processes. 
While some focus on the ways in which government concessions lead to infighting (Fjelde and 
Nilsson 2018; Plank 2017), others argue that, knowing this, governments may use such offers 
tactically in order to divide and weaken the armed opposition—a strategy referred to elsewhere as 
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“winning away pieces” or “dividing and conceding” (Reiter 2016; Cunningham 2011; Zartman 
1995).4 Others point to ethnic or organizational cohesion (Cunningham 2013; Ishiyama and Batta 
2011; Asal et al. 2012), shifts in the balance of power between factions (Best and Bapat 2018; Tamm 
2016), or the nature of conflict-related grievances (Lounsbery and Cook 2011; Mosinger 2018) as key 
to determining the potential for factionalism. While the origins of factional rivalries may also impact 
the interests and strategies of rebel elites, the aim of this study is to explore the processes through 
which disagreement over the terms of peace ultimately translates into defection. I argue that contested 
settlements create shared incentives for rebel elites inside and outside of a peace process to spoil, 
increasing the likelihood of an opportunistic alliance between splintering factions and excluded 
rebellions. The theoretical logic rests on several observable and interrelated propositions.  
First, it is widely acknowledged that peace processes are likely to face opposition from elites 
within the rebel party. Negotiations may proceed without the full support of the movement, and 
opposing factions may even be successful in preventing a settlement if leaders are keen to maintain 
cohesion and avoid weaking the group’s bargaining position (Best and Bapat 2018). Where leaders go 
on to sign a settlement, however, the finalized terms provide a clear indication to rebel elites about the 
likely winners and losers in the rewards exchanged for a commitment to demobilize. Although much 
of the spoiling literature portrays such dynamics as reflecting irreconcilable divisions between rebel 
hard-liners and moderates (Kydd and Walter 2006; Ayres 2006), these elite-level rifts more often rest 
on the fact that the spoils of peace are finite and must be selectively allocated (Plank 2017). The rebel 
infighting that took place over the distribution of ministerial positions in successive transitional 
governments in Liberia has been well documented, for example (Lidow 2016; Nygard and Weintraub 
2015; Bekoe 2005), while Reiter (2016) attributes the breakdown of a 1994 Djibouti settlement to 
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“powerful losers” (31) in the FRUD rebellion, who went on to accept a new bargain just five years 
later.  
At a minimum, key stakeholders in the rebel party should be willing to commit to a bargain 
that provides a satisfactory payoff for their efforts and offsets the risk of disarming for themselves and 
their followers. Elites perceiving themselves as insufficiently rewarded or—in many cases—
existentially threatened by the outcome have a strong incentive to mobilize their followers against it. 
Although they may ideally seek to renegotiate more favourable terms, these side-lined factions are 
generally perceived as weak relative to the rebel contingent that signs the settlement, especially in the 
eyes of the government and international mediators, and they may therefore “find few strictly political 
means at their disposal” in the immediate term (Pearlman 2009, 84; Werner 1999). Thus, with a 
signed settlement serving as an indication to relevant stakeholders that the metaphorical train is 
leaving the station (Stedman 1997), a recourse to violence may become the only viable alternative for 
disgruntled factions to accepting a bad deal.  
At the same time, latent defectors are constrained in their capacity to convince followers to 
return to the battlefield. In order to maximize the viability of a new rebellion, they must weigh up 
available opportunities for accessing the resources of war in the future—especially financing, 
weapons, and recruits—and it is in this context that a rival rebellion may begin to appear as an 
attractive ally (Christia 2012). According to Bapat and Bond (2012), committing to an alliance is 
costly for rebel elites, which helps to explain why they are empirically much more rare than would be 
expected based on shared strategic interests. The first-order preference of latent defectors should 
therefore be to launch a new rebellion outright, without bearing any unnecessary costs to reputation or 
bargaining power, such as by finding access to a new state sponsor or lootable resources (Greenhill 
and Major 2007; Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed 2017; Tamm 2016). Where no such opportunities 
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exist, rebel leaders and international actors may find it easier to reign in potential defectors and 
prevent splintering, forcing disgruntled factions to accept their worse-case outcome of disarming 
under threat of political exclusion or personal insecurity. In such contexts, the option to join forces 
with an active group outside the peace process may provide a the only viable alternative for latent 
defectors to avoid surrendering. 
In sum, the theoretical logic developed in this section emphasizes the ways in which the terms 
of peace may shift the preference ordering of rebel faction leaders. Where settlements create shared 
incentives to spoil—for both disgruntled factions in the signatory party as well as rebel groups 
excluded from a settlement—faction leaders should be more willing to bear the costs of an alliance, 
especially where they lack opportunities to defect unilaterally. The next section provides an in-depth 
study of a failed peace process in Uganda as a clear illustration of the mechanisms underlying this 
theory. 
 
Defection by alliance in Uganda 
Protracted negotiations ultimately resulted in separate bargains between the government of 
Yoweri Museveni and the military and political wings of the Uganda People’s Democratic 
Army/Movement (UPDA/M): the Pece Agreement in June 1988 and the Addis Accord in July 1990. 
The rebellion drops out of cross-national data after 1987 (Themnér and Wallensteen 2013), and as a 
result, the peace process is classified as a successful case of conflict termination in quantitative work. 
However, closer inspection reveals that a small fraction of the movement effectively demobilized, and 
that in fact, the lion’s share of the UPDA/M’s remaining military capacity joined forces with the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The research collected for this study reveals that this faction 
represented the most highly trained, well equipped, and organized element of the LRA at a time that 
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coincides with its own emergence as a viable rebellion.5 Thus, not only does the UPDA/M provide an 
ideal case for illustrating the theoretical logic outlined in the previous section, but it is of particular 
value in demonstrating the validity problems that arise when measuring armed groups discretely. The 
evidence presented here is based on approximately nine months of cumulative field research, drawing 
on news media and radio archives, as well as interviews with former rebel officers and government 
representatives conducted between January 2013 and August 2014. 
 
Case background. The UPDA/M emerged in opposition to the government of Yoweri Museveni after 
his own insurgency took power in a coup in January 1986, bringing an end to Uganda’s Bush War. 
Northerners—having been over-represented in the preceding government and military of Milton 
Obote—were systematically excluded from Museveni’s administration, causing widespread fear that 
he planned to use his newfound position to seek retribution for state-sponsored atrocities committed 
during the war (Tripp 2010; Lindemann 2010).6 With more than ten thousand soldiers from the 
deposed national army and a political wing comprising high-level members of Obote’s former ruling 
party, the UPDA/M represents a uniquely formidable actor in Uganda’s long history of violent 
conflict. By early 1988, after barely a year of direct confrontation, Museveni had agreed to negotiate a 
truce. 
Indications of a rift among the UPDA/M leadership were present from the outset. The initial 
stages of peace talks in Pece were dominated by the commander of the UPDA military wing, 
Brigadier Odong Latek, to the exclusion of the movement’s politicians exiling in London and Nairobi 
(Lamwaka 1998)—including its Chairman, and former Prime Minister, Otema Allimadi. The initial 
proposal of terms presented by Latek in March 1988 largely neglected the UPDM’s political goals, 
prompting Allimadi to appear on BBC’s “Focus on Africa” to disown the peace talks and reject the 
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ceasefire. Just ten days later, however, Latek travelled to the demobilization camp in Lukome to sign a 
deal.  
While observers expected a final settlement to be imminent, the revised draft presented by the 
government contingent contained a number of unilateral amendments, including a stipulation that any 
officer-level appointments would be conditional on confirmation by Museveni, and only after full 
disarmament (“Ugandan rebel commander…” 1988). Initially, the military wing was unified in its 
rejection of these new terms, publicly referring to themselves as the “pillars of the movement” in a 
display of solidarity with Latek, who refused to sign. When it became clear that the government 
contingent would not budge on the terms, however, the schism among the rebel leadership became 
apparent. While Latek reaffirmed the military campaign, the UPDA/M Central Executive Committee 
(CEC) announced on 8 May that both he and Allimadi had been summarily released from their 
positions, and that the group’s military and political affairs would be assumed by the remaining 
military high command. Lieutenant Colonel John Angelo Okello was named as Commander and 
Chairman of the UPDA/M, and he avowed that the majority of the movement remained loyal to the 
peace process (“UPDA ousts…” 1988). Okello signed the Pece Agreement on behalf of the UPDA/M 
on 3 June, and soon after, he was co-opted into the national military along with the five other CEC 
officers who had voted to support the settlement and oust its opponents.  
Meanwhile, in London, Allimadi appeared for a second time to denounce the peace process, 
referring to the government’s passage of an amnesty bill as a “partial amnesty” and a “trick” by 
Museveni. This time, the move was effective, as rumors began to circulate among UPDA ranks that 
the settlement was a ruse to convince northerners to hand over their weapons. The number of soldiers 
arriving at Lukome began to slow considerably. In total, just 2,200 rebel troops were effectively 
disarmed during the post-settlement period—no more than one-fifth of the UPDA’s total forces.7 As 
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Museveni dispatched government emissaries to renegotiate the surrender of the remaining troops in 
hiding along the Sudanese border, Allimadi appeared again to claim uncontested leadership and 
recommit the UPDA/M to violent rebellion.   
 
From schism to alliance. After two years without progress or violence, in July 1990, Allimadi 
surprised observers by unilaterally announcing that he had agreed to a peace deal in Addis Ababa. The 
negotiations were shrouded in secrecy,8 but a statement released via Uganda’s state-owned media 
suggests that the verbal agreement—known as the Addis Accord—was nothing more than a reiteration 
of the terms reached in Pece two years earlier, which Allimadi had vehemently rejected (“Uganda 
signs accord…” 1990). For the remaining UPDA officers, this was an indication that the savvy 
politician had struck a backroom deal with Museveni, advantaging himself and his inner circle while 
neglecting the interests and security of the broader movement. They were especially alarmed by the 
stipulation that soldiers would “leave their operational bases under their respective commanders and 
report for disarmament,” issuing a press release in which they pointed to Allimadi’s removal by the 
CEC as evidence that he was not a “genuine representative” of the rebellion and that he lacked 
authority to negotiate on its behalf (“Peace Process…” 1990). In a symbolic gesture of the extent of 
their opposition, one rebel battalion launched a brief wave of violence which resulted in at least 70 
deaths and culminated in the destruction of Allimadi’s personal residence (“Uganda government…” 
1990). 
Despite Allimadi’s frequent public appeals for demobilization,9 no more than a handful of 
rebel troops reported for disarmament following the Addis Accord. At the same time, his co-optation 
into government left little hope for further renegotiation, as the remnants of the exiled UPDM political 
wing had resigned from their positions in protest—which, furthermore, eliminated any prospects for 
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future financing from abroad. The culmination of the protracted peace process thus left the remaining 
military faction in a substantially weakened bargaining position by late 1990. Meanwhile, security 
fears were at an all-time high, largely a result of Allimadi’s previous attempts to undermine peace 
talks by stoking suspicions about Museveni’s intentions. Rather than surrender under such conditions, 
the remaining UPDA officer corps, along with at least five- to eight thousand troops and their 
weapons, were incorporated into Joseph Kony’s LRA. 
 
Assessing rival arguments. Traditional rationalist arguments about commitment failures fail to 
sufficiently account for defection in this case, as a series of early events heightened mutual suspicions, 
yet ultimately failed to derail the peace talks. In March 1988, a highly respected UPDA officer and 
member of the negotiating contingent was accidentally shot and killed by government forces, while 
Uganda’s health minister threatened via state radio that “[a]mnesty is expiring…Run, run for your 
lives.” It is therefore insufficient to merely establish that gaps in information and credibility exist; 
rather, valid causal inference requires a precise understanding of the ways in which the preferences of 
rival factions shift over the course of bargaining in response to prevailing opportunities. 
Second, owing to its longevity and brutality, the LRA has received ample media attention, 
which tends to portray the movement and its leader as ideological extremists and rent-seeking 
opportunists. This may suggest that the UPDA defectors were “hard-liners” opposed to striking a deal 
with Museveni’s government and seeking a similarly extremist ally to help undermine the peace 
process with violence (Kydd and Walter 2006; Stedman 1997). Although the LRA has become 
increasingly elusive in recent years, however, Kony initially expressed a willingness to join the 1988 
Pece peace talks if they “bore fruit.” The LRA also went on to engage in peace negotations with 
Museveni’s government after the UPDA merger, eventually signing a comprehensive settlement in 
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Juba in 2008.10 The movement’s increasingly extremist and opportunistic position therefore appears as 
much a result of these failed attempts to negotiate peace as a convincing explanation for defection in 
this case. 
Finally, much of the existing work on rebel alliances suggests that an ideological or identity-
based affinity is necessary if elites are to overcome commitment costs (Gade et al. 2019; Bapat and 
Bond 2012; Bencherif and Cambana 2017), and at first glance, this case appears to confirm such a 
position. Both the UPDA/M and LRA were primarily comprised of ethnic Acholis, and they had 
overlapping operational bases in the areas surrounding Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, and Soroti. In fact, prior to 
recruiting for his own rebellion, Kony served as an advisor to the UPDA’s Black Battalion, and there 
is evidence that the two groups shared information about government troop movements (Doom and 
Vlassenroot 1999; Van Acker 2004). Arguments focusing on shared goals or ethnic and geographic 
overlap fail to account for the timing of the merger, however. In the period leading up to negotiations 
with the government in 1988, the two groups engaged in an intense competition for advantageous 
bargaining position, including covert missions to appropriate each other’s weapons as well as overt 
battlefield clashes (Branch 2005; Allen 1991). Suspicions intensified when UPDA negotiators 
accepted a stipulation that ex-combatants would be transformed into task forces responsible for 
locating and defeating the LRA, with Kony accusing the UPDA/M of using the peace talks to avenge 
previous battlefield defeats (Okello 2002). In this light, the willingness of defecting UPDA officers to 
be absorbed under Kony’s banner in late-1990—a move that would have been unthinkable in the 
years, and even months, prior—reflects the shift in preference ordering that occurred when the 
bargaining process ended. With the Addis Accord signaling that no further negotiations would take 
place, the neglected military wing was forced to either surrender under risky and uncertain conditions, 
or else accept an opportunistic alliance with an erstwhile rival. It chose the latter.  
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The evidence presented in this section supports a strategic perspective of rebel alliances as a 
pathway to splintering in the post-settlement period. It also reveals the problems of measurement error 
that may arise when coding armed groups discretely, as the incomplete demobilizaton of the UPDA/M 
is pivotal to explaining the LRA’s emergence as a viable rebellion in the early 1990s.11 Kony had 
previously inherited the poorly trained and ill-equipped remnants of a third northern rebellion, the 
Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), which suffered a crushing battlefield defeat to Museveni’s military in 
1987, causing his predecessor to flee into exile (Dunn 2004; Day 2011; Okello 2002; Branch et al. 
2010). With the absorption of the UPDA military wing, however, his ragtag troops were fortified and 
trained in “conventional military tactics and objectives.”12 Ex-UPDA officers became Kony’s top 
commanders and closest advisors, and they are credited with formulating the tactic of terror against 
civilians that would become a hallmark of the LRA conflict (Van Acker 2004). This case therefore 
corroborates work by Debos (2008), who concludes that although “these groups [may] seem harmless, 
they can play a renewed role in the factional game when they are able to forge a new alliance…[and] 
thus re-emerge as critical actors” (232). The next section describes the data and method used to 
analyse the extent to which this defection pathway is generalizable beyond a single case. 
 
Data and method 
 The nature of cross-national data means that quantitative work on conflict resolution is largely 
precluded from measuring and testing the mechanisms on which competing theories rely. By focusing 
on average treatment effects across covariates, statistical techniques mask heterogeneity in pathways 
of rebel defection from settlements. Moreover, as illustrated in the previous section, the discrete 
coding of armed groups may cause cases of post-settlement splintering to be misclassified as resolved 
conflicts. In order to test my theory of strategic alliances, therefore, this study moves beyond the 
18 
 
extant data, relying instead on a two-stage qualitative research design. Formally elaborated by 
Haggard and Kaufman (2012), the analytical method involves a systematic coding of causal process 
observations (CPOs) across a large sample of cases and aggregation of the results across the full 
sample. 
 The relevant sample for the analysis is all rebel parties to negotiated settlements signed in Sub-
Saharan Africa between 1975 and 2015. In identifying the universe of settlements, I consulted a wide 
range of appropriate sources, especially UN Peacemaker, the US Institute of Peace, the University of 
Ulster’s Transitional Justice database, and the Conciliation Resources ACCORD collection.13 As the 
analytical focus of this study is to illuminate the processes through which parties defect after having 
committed to peace, a negotiated settlement must result from direct negotiations between at least two 
belligerent parties involved in an intra-state conflict, and represent a mutually accepted and final 
solution in order to qualify. While the substantive provisions may vary considerably, these basic 
criteria require, at minimum, that the formally recognized leadership of a rebel party commits to 
demobilization, therefore excluding temporary ceasefires—which are especially prone to breakdown 
(Toft 2010)—and cases in which opposing factions are successful in spoiling a settlement prior to its 
signing. The resulting sample includes a total of 84 settlements signed in 22 countries. 
 Next, I relied on the settlement text to identify rebel signatory parties.14 Consistent with Reiter 
(2016), the analysis is therefore not limited to major actors involved in the conflict, nor to groups 
coded as active in the conflict-year according to the UCDP Armed Conflict dataset, although 
extensive research was conducted on each case to ensure that the rebellion reached a minimum 
violence threshold of 25 annual battle deaths and remained active at the time of signing. This strategy 
excludes signatories which had already effectively demobilized and any political movements lacking a 
direct link to an armed group or military wing—for example, Burundi’s Frodebu political party, which 
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signed on to the 2000 Arusha Power Sharing Accord alongside three active militias. A rebel party may 
enter the dataset more than once if it defected from a settlement, returned to violent activities, and 
went on to sign a new bargain at a later date. This identification strategy yields a sample of 159 
government-and-rebel settlement dyads. 
  Unlike other studies relying on a CPO method of analysis to test mechanisms, I do not select 
on the dependent variable—in this case, rebel defection. Again, the limitations of existing data make it 
difficult to adjudicate between cases of conflict termination and those of partial demobilization, 
whereby groups splinter or merge and factions may resurface under a new name. Thus, after 
compiling a wide range of primary and secondary source material, I took a broad, qualitative approach 
to tracing each group’s trajectory over a five-year post-settlement period. Descriptive background 
from the UCDP Actor Encyclopedia15 was combined with Lexis Nexis news media searches, U.N. 
Panel of Experts and U.S. State Department reports, NGO reports, and academic case studies. The 
compiled qualitative evidence was then used to operationalize three CPOs that correspond with the 
central argument. Work by John Gerring (2006, 2008), David Collier (1993, 2011), and others 
(George and Bennett 2005; Przeworski and Teune 2010) supports the use of causal process 
observations (CPOs)—or “system-specific indicators”—as a tool for systematizing qualitative 
methods and analysing causation across a large sample. According to Gerring (2006): 
“…the ramifications [of a single case] may be generalizable, and indeed may be quite broad in 
scope…Noncomparable bits of evidence can be transformed into comparable bits of 
evidence—that is, standardized ‘observations’—simply by getting more bits of evidence and 
coding them according to type” (178-183). 
  
An inductive reading of the UPDA/M case study points to three distinct CPOs which may 
occur in the period between a signed settlement (t0) and either demobilization or defection (t1), which 
are illustrated in an updated diagram of post-settlement pathways in Figure 2. First, an internal schism 
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may become apparent within the rebel party—a concept which I borrow from Plank (2017). Rebel 
elites often voice opposition when fearing their interests are neglected by the negotiation process (De 
Juan 2012, 11-12; Reiter 2016; Schlichte 2009), and in many cases they are successful in amending 
the terms. In light of the theoretical logic proposed here, what matters is whether a faction of the 
signatory party remains opposed to the final settlement, or the terms ultimately accepted by the 
group’s recognized leadership. Schism is theoretically and analytically distinct from splintering, 
whereby rebellions fragment into discrete groups with at least one new group returning to conflict. As 
such, it also likely to be much more empirically common. Of 159 rebel parties in the sample, 70 
exhibit schism over the settlement terms. 
 
 





A second CPO identifies the presence of an excluded rebellion—an armed group outside the 
peace process with both incentive and capacity to spoil. A study by Nilsson (2008) suggests that the 
presence of such groups should be irrelevant to the prospects for dyadic peace, as signatories have 
likely accounted for the behaviour of excluded spoilers prior to signing a settlement. If excluded 
rebellions spoil by directly facilitating splintering, however, as my argument holds, then this finding 
may be biased due to reliance on the UCDP Armed Conflict dataset, in which such pathways tend to 
appear as resolved conflicts.  
The third and final CPO measures whether a merger takes place with an excluded group, 
which enables a dissenting faction of the signatory party to return to rebellion. Rebel alliances vary in 
organiziational form according to groups’ preferences and capacities, with existing work suggesting 
that most are informal and relatively short-lived (Akcinarogly 2012; Christia 2012). Although elites 
may prefer to avoid the costs of combining forces, these tacit or informal pacts can easily transform 
into bitter rivalries (Fjelde and Nilsson 2012), and groups may “spend as much time fighting one 
another as contesting the government” (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013, 519). Since the 
strategic logic rests on rebel elites’ willingness to bear costs in order to maximize the viability of their 
return to rebellion, the identification creteria requires a formal unification of forces. 
All 159 government-rebel dyads were coded dichotomously across the three CPOs defined 
here. The complete results of this coding exercise are provided in Table I, with a corresponding list of 
rebel group acronyms in the Appendix.16 Since “evidence for one link in the chain has no bearing on 
the next (or previous) link” (Gerring 2008, 174), the three observations are treated as analytically 
discrete rather than causally deterministic. By allowing for deviations at each step in the CPO 
pathway, this strategy generates a series of nested research designs, allowing for alternative pathways 
to defection, as well as the possibility that the three CPOs are present even in cases of 
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demobilization—ample opportunity to disconfirm the central theory. To this end, the second stage of 
the analysis entails aggregating the data across the full sample in order to analyse evidence for the 






















               
1991 Bicesse Accords UNITA    ü 
1994 Lusaka Protocol UNITA ü   ü 
1999 Agreement with UNITA-Renovada Updating the 
Lusaka Protocol 
UNITA-Renovada ü ü ü ü 
2002 Memorandum of Understanding UNITA     
Burundi  2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement CNDD ü ü ü ü 
Frolina  ü  ü 
Palipehutu ü ü ü ü 
2002 Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional 
Government and the CNDD-FDD 
CNDD-FDD  ü  ü 
2003 Pretoria Protocol CNDD-FDD  ü  ü 
2004 Accord de Partage de Pouvoir CNDD  ü   
CNDD-FDD  ü   
Frolina  ü   
2006 Dar es Salaam Agreement Palipehutu-FNL ü   ü 
2008 Joint Declaration Palipehutu-FNL     
Central African Republic  
  
2007 Syrte Agreement UFDR ü ü  ü 
2007 Birao Agreement UFDR ü ü  ü 
2008 Accord de Paix Global UFDR ü ü  ü 
APRD ü ü  ü 
2011 Accord de cessez le feu entre l'UFDR et la CPJP 
sous l'égide du Conseil National de la Mediation 
(CNM) 
UFDR ü ü ü ü 
CPJP ü ü ü ü 
2013 Libreville Political Accord UFDR  ü ü ü 
CPJP  ü ü ü 
CPSK  ü ü ü 
UFR  ü   
2014 Accord de cessation des hostilités en République 
centrafricaine 
Séléka-Rénovée  ü   
RJ ü ü  ü 
MLCJ ü ü  ü 
UFRF  ü   
2015 Republican Pact for Peace, National 
Reconciliation and Reconstruction 
RJ ü ü  ü 
MLCJ ü ü ü ü 
Chad  
 
2003 Peace agreement between the Government of 
Chad and the MDJT 
MDJT ü ü  ü 
2005 Yebibou Agreement MDJT ü ü ü ü 



















UFDDF  ü ü ü 
RFC  ü ü ü 
2009 Peace agreement between the government and the 
National Movement  
UFDDR  ü   
Comoros  2003 Famboni Agreements MPA/Anjouan     
Congo, Democratic Republic 
 
1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement MLC  ü ü ü 
2002 Global and All-Inclusive Agreement MLC  ü   
RCD-K-ML ü ü   
RCD-N ü ü   
2003 Inter-Congolese Political Dialogue, The Final Act RCD-Goma ü ü ü ü 
2008 Act of Engagement, North Kivu CNDP ü ü  ü 
2009 23 March 2009 Agreement CNDP ü ü ü ü 
2013 Final Comminqué on the Kampala Dialogue M23 ü ü  ü 
Congo, Republic  1999 Accords de cessation des hostilitiés en République 
du Congo 
Ninjas    ü 
Cobras     
MNLC ü    
MNLCR ü    
Resistance Sud Sud ü    
Bana Dol ü    
Côte d’Ivoire  
 
2003 Linas-Marcoussis Accord MJP   ü ü 
MPCI ü  ü ü 
MPIGO   ü ü 
2005 Pretoria Agreement FN    ü 
2007 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement FN     
Djibouti  
 
1994 Agreement on Peace and National Reconciliation FRUD ü   ü 
2000 General Agreement on Reform and Civil Concord FRUD-AD     
Ethiopia  1991 Transitional Charter ONLF ü ü ü ü 
OLF  ü ü ü 
Guinea-Bissau  1998 Abuja Peace Agreement Military junta    ü 
Liberia  
 
1991 Yamoussoukro Accords NPFL  ü  ü 
1993 Cotonou Agreement NPFL  ü  ü 
ULIMO ü ü ü ü 
1994 Akosombo Agreement NPFL ü ü ü ü 
ULIMO ü ü ü ü 
AFL  ü  ü 
1994 Accra Acceptance and Accession Agreement NPFL    ü 
CRC-NPFL     



















ULIMO-J    ü 
AFL    ü 
1995 Abuja Accord NPFL    ü 
ULIMO-K    ü 
ULIMO-J ü   ü 
AFL    ü 
1996 Abuja II Accord NPFL     
ULIMO-K    ü 
ULIMO-J    ü 
2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement LURD     
MODEL     
Mali  
 
1991 Tamranasset Accord MPA ü ü ü ü 
FIAA ü ü ü ü 
 Bamako Peace Pact MFUA ü   ü 
2006 Algiers Accord ATNMC  ü ü ü 
2013 Preliminary accord on presidential elections MNLA ü ü ü ü 
CMFPR ü ü ü ü 
MAA ü ü ü ü 
2015 Accord Pour la Paix et la Reconciliation au Mali CMA ü ü ü ü 
Mozambique  1992 General Peace Agreement Renamo     
2014 Declaração de Cessação das Hostilidades Militares Renamo     
Niger  
 
1993 Paris Accords FLAA ü ü ü ü 
1994 Ouagadougou Accords CRA ü ü ü ü 
1995 Definitive Peace Agreement ORA ü ü ü ü 
1997 Agreement between the Government of Niger, 
UFRA, and FARS 
UFRA     
FARS     
Senegal  
 
1991 Agreement Between Government of Senegal and 
the Movement of Democratic Forces of 
Casamance 
MFDC ü   ü 
2001 Agreement Between Government of Senegal and 
the MFDC 
MFDC ü   ü 
2004 Zinguinchor Peace Agreement MFDC ü   ü 
Sierra Leone  
 
1996 Abidjan Agreement RUF  ü  ü 
1999 Lomé Peace Agreement RUF  ü ü ü 





















1993 Addis Ababa Agreement USC-Mahdi ü ü ü ü 
USC/SNA ü ü ü ü 
SDM-Mahdi ü ü   
SDM/SNA ü ü ü ü 
SPM-Mahdi ü ü ü ü 
SPM/SNA ü ü ü ü 
SSDF ü ü ü ü 
SNF  ü ü ü 
     
1997 
 
Cairo Declaration USC-Mahdi ü ü ü ü 
USC/SNA  ü ü ü 
SSDF-Muse  ü   
SSDF-Yusuf  ü ü ü 
SPM  ü ü ü 
SPM/SNA  ü   
SNF ü ü ü ü 
RRA  ü ü ü 
2002 Declaration on Structures and Principles of the 
National Reconciliation Process 
SSRC     
JVA     
RRA     
USC-Mahdi-Afrah     
SNF-Bihi     
SPM     
2006 Communiqués on Talks UIC ü ü ü ü 
2008 Djibouti Agreement ARS ü ü ü ü 
2010 Agreement between the Transitional Federal 
Government and Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a 
ASWJ  ü   
South Africa  1991 National Peace Accord ANC ü    
Sudan  
 
1986 Koka Dam Declaration SPLM/A ü   ü 
1995 Political Charter SPLA-United  ü ü ü 
1996 Political Charter SSIM  ü ü ü 
SPLA-BGG  ü   
1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement SSIM ü ü ü ü 
EDF  ü   
SPLA-United  ü   
2005 Cairo Agreement SLM/A ü ü  ü 



















2006 Darfur Peace Agreement SLM/A ü ü ü ü 
JEM ü ü ü ü 
2006 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement ESF  ü   
2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur JEM ü ü ü ü 
LJM ü ü ü ü 
2013 Agreement between the Government and JEM-
Sudan 
JEM-Sudan  ü   
Uganda  
 
1985 Nairobi Peace Agreement NRA  ü  ü 
1988 Pece Agreement UPDA/M ü ü ü ü 
2002 Yumbe Agreement UNRFII  ü   





Discussion of findings 
The aggregated findings summarized in Table II corroborate a general scholarly consensus that 
settlement is an unstable outcome of conflict, as compared to military victory (Toft 2010; Collier et al. 
2008; Licklider 1995), as less than one-third of African rebel parties—just 46 of 159 cases (28.9%)—
fully demobilized in the post-settlement period. Defection appears much more common, with conflict 
continuing among more than half of all settlement dyads: 101 cases, or 63.5%. The remaining 12 
cases (7.6%) fail to conclusively conform with any of the post-settlement pathways identified in 
Figure 2. Consistent with Haggard and Kaufman (2012), any CPO analysis across a large sample is 
likely to face difficulties categorizing every case conclusively, and due to the scarcity or imprecision 
of available observable evidence, this challenge is compounded when researching conflict zones. 













Rebel Defection  
Total Recurrence Splintering 
12 46 47 54 159 
7.6% 28.9% 29.6% 33.9% 100% 
Defection pathway2 1 2 3 4 5  
Observations 
Percentage 
47 13 5 36 101 








1 Ambiguity most often results from a deficiency of observable data needed to confirm a group’s trajectory during the five-
year post-settlement period. Examples include the FLEC-R in Angola (2006), LDF and LPC in Liberia, and HCUA in 
Mali (2013). Where uncertainty precludes coding decisions, cases are not listed in Table I. In Rwanda (1993) and Chad 
(2002), the government party initially defected back to the battlefield. 
2 Numbered defection pathways correspond with those labelled in Figure 2. 
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Of the 101 cases of rebel defection in the sample, less than half (46.5%) presented as a clear 
case of Recurrence (see Table II), whereby the signatory party returned to rebellion from the top-
down. The common, dichotomous approach to conflict outcomes in existing work means that 
arguments about defection have overwhelmingly focused on such cases of buyer’s remorse, in which 
rebel leaders misjudge their ability to either control the implementation process to their advantage or 
win post-conflict elections, leading them to mobilize a wholesale defection when conditions begin to 
appear unfavourable during the post-settlement period. However, 54 cases of defection do not fit 
neatly into the Recurrence category, as although one or more factions of the signatory party returned 
to war, a sizeable proportion of the movement may have remained committed to the settlement and 
demobilized. In total, approximately one-third of cases in the sample (33.9%) and more than half of 
all defections (53.5%) resulted in Splintering (Table II)—a proportion that is consistent with cross-
national findings on the frequency of rebel fragmentation in civil wars (Rudloff and Findley 2016).17  
As a test of the theory elaborated in section III, the analysis provides strong support for several 
observable implications. First and foremost, of the 54 cases that exhibited both schism and the 
presence of an excluded rebellion (see Table I), a merger was observed in 36 cases (66.7%), while 
demobilization resulted in just two such instances (3.7%). Thus, where the outside alliance option is 
available to opposing factions of a signatory party, it seems highly unlikely that committed 
stakeholders will be able to reign in opportunities for defection. This post-settlement pathway—
labelled as pathway (5) in Figure 2 and Table II—accounts for more than one-third of all cases of 
defection in the sample (35.6%), suggesting that the overlooked link between Uganda’s UPDA/M and 
LRA is a much more generalizeable phenomenon than has been recognized to date. Similar processes 
were observed in conflicts as varied as Mali, Sudan, Liberia, and Somalia, among others. 
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Moreover, in a small subset of cases exhibiting both a schism and an excluded rebellion, 
Splintering was enabled by a temporary, informal rebel alliance during the post-settlement period—
pathway (4) in Figure 2—rather than a formal merger. This is further evidence that groups finding 
themselves excluded from negotiations may be willing to coordinate assaults or share information, 
weapons, and even troops in order to spoil a settlement by directly enabling a splintering faction’s 
return to the fray, even where rebel elites do not formally commit to join forces. At the same time, just 
five cases in the sample correspond with this alternative pathway (4), accounting for 5% of defections 
and 9.3% of the subset of rebel Splintering (Table II). In comparison, the empirical frequency with 
which Splintering occurs via merger lends strong support to one of the central theoretical propositions 
in section III, demonstrating that the signing of a settlement makes defecting elites more willing to 
bear the costly trade-off of a formal alliance in order to maximize the viability of future rebellion. 
 Where a schism results in Splintering without the help of an excluded rebellion, the qualitative 
evidence confirms that defecting factions typically enjoyed access to alternative sources of rents, such 
as external patrons or lootable resources, as is consistent with the proposed theory. As an example, 
after the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) was forced to accept the terms of Ethiopia’s 1991 
Transitional Charter due to the ousting of its backer, Somalia’s Siad Barre, a splintering faction 
calling itself the Ogaden Liberation Army (ONLA) found its own sponsor in the newly independent 
government of Eritrea. Although far less common than the route to Splintering via alliance—since 
such opportunities are not universally available—the 13 cases following pathway (3) (see Figure 2 
and Table II) corroborate existing scholarship which stresses the importance of external opportunity 
structures in determining the potential for a viable return to rebellion.18 
Finally, in weighing the costs and benefits of an alliance, there is ample evidence to suggest 
that the strategic goal of maximizing military capacity often overrides constraints related to identity or 
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ideology. Challenging conclusions derived from formal models of contestation or studies of alliances 
in a single case, a large number of mergers in the sample occurred between groups viewing 
themselves as bitter rivals at the time, even those that had recently met on the battlefield. Factions of 
the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
attacked each other multiple times before joining forces in 2007 as the United Resistance Front 
(URF)19 in a unified rejection of the Darfur Peace Agreement signed the previous year. Simililarly, in 
CAR, militias fighting on opposing sides of the 2013 Séléka/anti-Balaka conflict joined forces two 
years after signing the Libreville Political Accord. The aggregated data therefore supports a strategic 
perspective in line with Christia (2012), who argues that alliances are primarily driven not by ethnicity 
or shared demands, but by the prevailing opportunity structure and considerations about future 
viability. 
 In sum, according to the results of the large-N qualitative analysis, the post-settlement 
trajectories of most rebel parties in Africa fail to correspond with the dichotomous operationalization 
of conflict termination or recurrence that is common in the field. In fact, rebel splintering is a more 
empirically common outcome than either demobilization or recurrence, and the vast majority of such 
cases of splintering in the sample occured through a formal alliance with an excluded rebellion, 
lending strong support to the theoretical logic proposed in section III. Where contested settlements 
create a schism in the signatory party, latent defectors seek to mobilize defection, looking to 
alternative sources of revenue as their first-order preference to maximize viability. Where such 
opportunities are not forthcoming, however, disgruntled elites may be forced to either accept the 
worst-case scenario of disarming under adverse terms, or more likely, where excluded groups share 





Recognizing that “[t]he norm in more recent civil conflicts is not coherent antagonists as much 
as shifting coalitions of groups with malleable allegiances ” (Pearlman and Cunningham 2012), much 
has been made of the need for more research which challenges the notion of bargaining parties as 
binary and discrete. This paper contributes to this effort in three important ways. First, while much of 
the existing work on splintering focuses on the processes through which schisms emerge during 
bargaining, this study reveals an overlooked pathway through which opposing factions can re-emerge 
as viable challenges to the state. In so doing, the focus shifts away from dynamics of factionalism, 
which are likely to vary from case to case, towards a broader puzzle about why multiparty conflicts 
are especially difficult to resolve. The logic behind the theory of defection-by-strategic alliance points 
to some precise mechanisms that may help to explain findings in previous studies, for example, that 
rebel fragmentation is correlated with conflicts of longer duration (Findley and Rudloff 2012; 
Cunningham 2013). 
Second, by explicitly allowing for unit heterogeneity across cases of defection, the analysis 
reveals the frequency of post-settlement pathways that may be censored or misclassified due to the 
discrete coding of armed groups in cross-national data. More than one-third of rebel parties in the 
sample follow a trajectory which diverges from the dichotomous conflict outcomes of termination or 
recurrence, resulting instead in splintering. Far beyond the Ugandan case explored in detail here, the 
results indicate that strategic mergers are highly prevalent in the larger sample, and the fact that such 
outcomes result in the identification of “new” groups may explain why quantitative work has found no 
direct link between the behaviour of excluded spoilers and the potential for defection among 
signatories (Nilsson 2008; Plank 2017). In contrast, the results of the present analysis indicate that 
rival groups factor directly into the strategic calculations of potential defectors, by providing 
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disgruntled elites the opportunity to avoid their worst-case outcome of surrendering without 
acceptable guarantees.  
In this way, these findings also promise to provide policymakers with a better understanding of 
the unique challenges of bargaining where conflicts are fractionalized. If settlements are prone to fail 
where they create shared incentives for key stakeholders to spoil, then mediators should aim to 
eliminate the outside option for defection by promoting all-inclusive negotiations, rather than merely 
attempting to reign in spoilers ex post. Reports on attempts to broker peace in newly independent 
South Sudan by focusing efforts on the primary challenge to President Kiir’s government—to the 
exclusion of an estimated two dozen other militias—reveal the ways in which politically expedient 
mediation strategies may ultimately prove counter-productive.20 
Some important questions remain. For one thing, although there are practical and 
methodological justifications for relying on a regional sample—especially in order to maximize cross-
case comparability in the absence of statistical controls, as well as capitalizing on the researcher’s 
regional knowledge in operationalizing key concepts (Collier 2011; Gerring 2008)—the sampling 
specification makes it impossible to infer whether the results are generalizable beyond Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Rebel fluidity may be more prevalent in weakly institutionalized or more ethnically diverse 
contexts, for example. On the other hand, Bapat and Bond (2012) find the likelihood of rebel alliance 
onset to be unchanged with the addition of regional dummies, suggesting that Africa is not an outlier 
in this regard. Out of sample defection pathways confirming the central argument have been identified 
in Afghanistan and the Philippines. This highlights the need for further refinement of global, cross-
national data in order to better account for the fragmentation and merger of groups over time. 
Given the theoretical and analytical focus on the processes through which contested 
settlements break down, as previously mentioned, the initial drivers of internal contestation are 
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beyond the scope of this study. A growing literature exists to identify factors that may affect the 
potential for a schism to emerge, such as the nature of concessions offered by the government (Fjelde 
and Nilsson 2018; Plank 2017), the degree of organizational cohesion (Cunningham 2013; Ishiyama 
and Batta 2011) or social linkages (Mosinger 2018), and internal shifts in the balance of power (Best 
and Bapat 2018; Tamm 2016). Since these variables may also affect the preferences and strategies of 
elites who ultimately defect from a settlement, theory-building efforts should attempt to extend the 
model to earlier nodes of decision-making, for example, by defining the different “types” of rebel 
parties that enter into negotiations, the likelihood that contending factions will accept or reject various 
payoffs offered by the government, and the incentives of faction leaders to seek out particular groups 
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Front. See Reiter (2016, 2). 
2 For an insightful account of the theoretical evolution of the literature on civil war, from primordial or psychological 
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3 For a comprehensive and convincing critique, see especially Pearlman (2008). 
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after the group splintered. 
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to Museveni’s government during his 34-year tenure (Lewis 2010). 
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likely numbered more than ten thousand, a direct contradiction to Okello’s claim that the faction opposing the Pece 
Agreement retained only 150 loyal followers. 
8 Due to the absence of a signed document, and following the sampling criteria defined in section V, the “Addis Accord” is 
excluded from the sample used for the large-N CPO analysis (see Table I). Furthermore, with descriptive accounts 
indicating that the terms were unchanged from the Pece Agreement, the Addis Accord merely represented an attempt to 
commit the group’s political wing to the same peace process, rather than a discrete settlement. 
9 Transcripts from Radio Uganda, 26 November 1990 and 15 December 1990; See also “Ugandan rebel leader appeals to 
followers to stop fighting” 1990. 
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Issue 11, Conciliation Resources, London, April 2010, www.c-r.org/accord). 
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Savun (2009). 
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University. 
16 In order to promote transparency and enable related lines of inquiry, the Appendix also provides a list of references used 
to make coding decisions. Qualitative replication data is to be made available in the Perspectives Dataverse, 
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